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Michail Butov (Russia) 
 
In Russia today writers’ statements about politics resonate only when they are colored by 
extremism. Since I don’t consider myself an extremist in any area, with the exception, 
perhaps, of musical passions, the public podium for the presentation of my thoughts is 
inaccessible to me and I must content myself with Internet blogs. And that the opportunity 
to express myself presents itself in America, not at home, seems somewhat/quite strange. 
 
I suppose that today’s Russia doesn’t have any kind of individual problems of a completely 
specific type. Russia is a part of the globalized world, and all the unfolding processes and the 
existing tensions do not leave Russia on the side. These are the questions of the relationships 
between the state and the transnational corporations, the national problems of multinational 
countries, the economic problems of “raw material” based countries, and, finally, the 
relationship with the projected future, determining one’s place in the future world—the 
chances to get into the “golden billion” or be torn away and separated from the significant 
processes of the future, relegated to the “zone of death.” Russia is troubled by the same 
concerns as everyone else in the world. But there are peculiarities, individual shadings of 
these problems. And this shading is infused by a problem of a different nature, also common 
for the majority of developed countries and even entire continents—the problem of self-
identification.  
 
None of the major countries or the international country coalitions is today what they would 
like to appear to be. Europe, for instance, is having a harder and harder time holding on to 
the image of preserver of cultural traditions, the cradle of tolerance, the zone of absolute 
humanism, careful attention to human rights. The world is changing rapidly; new economic 
and political realities apply terrific pressure on all the existing and not so long ago seemingly 
unshakable social institutions. Those who want (and have the opportunity) to assure for 
themselves a promising future, are decisively rejecting the former models of social, 
economic, and simply inter-human relationships. This, for instance, is disintegrating and is 
threatening to make disappear altogether the very concept of the social. 
 
The problem of Russia lies in the fact that it doesn’t even know what it wants to look like: a 
modern, open country? a communist state with labor camps? an archaic monarchy with a 
tsar and nobility? or a bit of everything at the same time? Most importantly, there are many 
in Russia who cannot let go of the memory of the times when everyone was afraid of us—
and in this is seen the most important sign of the state’s power. But today’s political and 
economic condition of Russia does not allow it to return to the former state of affairs. And 
even if, let’s say, a new communist regime is forcibly established in the country, it will still 
end up being powerless from the economic standpoint, and, consequently, from the military. 
There exists only one realistic way—to develop, to gain access, to learn to compete as equals 
with all the world powers. But how is this possible with monstrous lagging behind in the 
area of high technologies, and taking into account that the strong powers are not at all 
interested in a new competitor? 
 
I used to think that when the generation that experienced the Soviet power disappears 
completely from the scene, everything will change in Russia. Today I don’t think that way. 
And I suppose Russia will never fully accept the liberal market ideology and, consequently, 
the western economic system—at least in it’s present form, although one cannot exclude the 
integration in the future with new economic models. And it has nothing to do with the still 
attractive and nationally popular slogan “Expropriate and divide!” Russia is a very traditional 
country and does not lose its traditional nature with the arrival of new generations, and sharp 
contradictions with many points of liberalism appear here literally on every step. I speak not 
of some sort of specific inflexibility—mental or political. It’s something different. I, 
personally, know young doctors who feel uncomfortable, ashamed of taking money from 
their patients—even though they get beggar’s wages—one can’t even live on them. They feel 
that such basic things like human health and human compassion cannot, must not, depend 
on the level of economic status of the patient, and must be accessible to all in equal degree. 
They think that it’s the state’s task to guarantee this equality, as well as the pay worthy of 
their work; otherwise it’s unclear why the state is needed at all. This, clearly, is socialism, but 
I don’t necessarily find these ideas repulsive. 
 
In other words, Russia presupposes for itself the presence of some kind of special, unique 
road, perhaps having a precedent in history, perhaps completely different from the ones 
already laid out. Only in reality, no such clear concept exists— with the exception of the 
broadly circulating idea that it wouldn’t be all that bad if everyone would start fearing us 
again. It doesn’t exist—and, most likely, will not appear any time soon, first and foremost 
because we have oil. The gigantic stream of oil dollars, the oil “needle” does not boost the 
economy or political thought, but, on the contrary, paralyses them. The power is endlessly 
perverted, used to the constant and practically free monetary injection. The population of 
the country hardly plays any economic role at all, 99 percent of what is called in Russia 
“economic life” is the process of redistribution of money, gained from the sale of oil and 
other natural resources. And instead of well thought out strategies about the future, at this 
point we have mostly a radically mythologized notion about the past, which, Soviet to some, 
pre-Revolutionary to others, seems a golden age to which we should return at any cost. 
 
Now a few words about culture. In my opinion, neither the years of Perestroika, nor the 
fifteen years of “new Russia” that followed, managed to create some kind of radically new 
cultural material, except on the level of pop culture and cultural trash. The new reality did 
not end up speaking its own language. Yes, some of the previously underground currents 
surfaced and emerged to leading positions. But, first of all, now even their time is passing, 
and, secondly, to my taste they still smell of the Soviet epoch,  if only as it’s flip-side. In 
essence, today’s Russian culture does not appear as something united. Let’s say that a unified 
Russian contemporary literature does not exist. There are several of them and their 
representatives often don’t even want to know about the existence of others. There is, for 
instance, quite popular, especially in the provinces, the very traditional, “soil” literature, 
continuing the line, to a large extent of the official Soviet literature, to a lesser extent—of 
talented village writers of the 70s. There is modernism, avant-garde, post modernism (also 
Russian-style), and there is a trend of moderate literature of the ‘intelligentsia’ to which yours 
truly subscribes. There is—appearing most recently—extremist literature, connected to 
nationalist movements, with ‘new bolshevism’ among them.  All these are different worlds, 
and they are not necessarily at war with each other, or despising each other—they simply are 
of no interest to one another. 
 
Despite everything I said, of course, this does not mean that in Russia there aren’t all that 
many talented, smart and capable people. There is a multitude. There are a lot of really good, 
meaningful books, large scale scientific discoveries happen. But all this exists in a disjointed 
state. People with a constructive outlook do not have the possibility of establishing 
communications, of presenting themselves as a social force. Not that the authorities disrupt 
such processes; rather they purposefully create conditions where such processes cannot 
materialize. Russian society fell apart into a number of ideological enclaves even before it 
had a chance to be formed, showing signs of life mainly on the Internet.  Against such a 
mixed but otherwise anemic background the more radical trends stand out most 
prominently, of course—and today they actually occupy a more and more visible space on 
the ideological map of Russia; their influence grows. Official ideology, which in reality 
doesn’t exist, cannot offer any alternatives, which is why the authorities try to utilize these 
trends.  But, I have to admit, they are playing with fire.        
                                               
 
